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Evidentiary and Procedural Trends in
State Legislation and Other Emerging
Legal Issues in Child Sexual Abuse Cases
Josephine A. Bulkley*
I. Introduction
Since the early 1980's, a number of states have undertaken stat-
utory reform efforts to improve the handling of child sexual abuse
cases in the legal system. Legislative reform in a few areas had be-
gun earlier, including a trend to abolish the corroboration require-
ment and to abolish competency tests for children.' For example, in
1981, a dozen states had eliminated competency qualifications of
child witnesses; by 1985, 23 states had made this change, nearly
twice the number of states in a four year period. The reasons moti-
vating the recent reform movement seem to be the greater awareness
and reports of child sexual abuse, the increasing number of cases
being prosecuted with children as witnesses in court, and wide circu-
lation of the ABA's Recommendations for Improving Legal Inter-
vention in intrafamily Child Sexual Abuse Cases with its range of
suggestions regarding state legislative action and other innovations in
legal intervention. An additional reason for some of the reforms re-
lates to changes in attitudes regarding children and their abilities.
The new legislation affecting the prosecution of child abuse
cases is designed to serve three basic purposes - to modify legal
procedures to be more sensitive to child victims, to improve prosecu-
tion and conviction rates, and to provide treatment in special pro-
grams for the offender, child and family. First, literature is replete
with documentation by mental health clinicians, child welfare pro-
fessionals, prosecutors, children's attorneys, and other legal experts
who stress that children suffer additional psychological harm by in-
* Project Director, Child Sexual Abuse Law Reform Project, National Legal Resource
Center for Child Advocacy and Protection, Washington, D.C.
I. Bulkley, Recommendations for Improving Legal Intervention in Child Sexual
Abuse Cases, Recommendations 4.1 and 4.2 and Commentary, American Bar Association,
Washington, D.C. (1982).
sensitive legal procedures.2 Second, until recent years, criminal pro-
ceedings often were not initiated (particularly in incest cases) due to
a variety of reasons, including lack of eyewitnesses or physical evi-
dence and perceptions that children were not credible witnesses. 3 Fi-
nally, since the 1970's, however, a number of specialized incest treat-
ment programs have developed around the country, some of which
were funded for several years by the National Center on Child
Abuse and Neglect to provide training to professionals in other juris-
dictions. These programs vary in terms of treatment philosophy and
their involvement with the legal system.
Although the effectiveness of programs that provide alternative
dispositions for offenders and their families should be explored, this
article deals only with reforms to minimize trauma and improve
prosecutions. This article will deal with two of these reforms that
have generated a significant amount of legislative activity - special
hearsay exceptions for complaints of sexual abuse by child victims
and videotaping or closed-circuit television procedures for taking a
child's testimony outside the courtroom. Legislative efforts in other
areas, such as videotaped interviews, competency, expert testimony,
civil protective orders or many other ideas outlined, for example, in
the ABA's Recommendations are not examined here." Appendix A,
however, contains a list of states that have adopted statutes in the
following areas: videotaped testimony, closed-circuit television testi-
mony, videotaped interviews, special hearsay exceptions, and the ab-
olition of competency requirements.
II. The Problems Defined
As some researchers suggest, new research relating to children
in the legal system would be helpful in a number of areas.5 These
2. L. Berliner & D. Stevens, Advocating for Sexually Abused Children in the Crimi-
nal Justice System, in Sexual Abuse of Children: Selected Readings, National Center on
Child Abuse and Neglect (1980); De Francis, Protecting the Child Victim of Sex Crimes,
American Humane Association (1969); MacFarlane, Sexual Abuse of Children, in The Vic-
timization of Women 81 (J. Chapman and M. Gates eds. 1978); Sgroi, Introduction: A Na-
tional Needs Assessment for Protecting Child Victims of Sexual Assault, in Sexual Assault of
Children and Adolescents xv (A. Burgess et al. eds. 1978); Child Sexual Abuse and the Law,
American Bar Association (J. Bulkley ed. 1981).
3. K. MacFarlane & J. Bulkley, Treating Child Sexual Abuse: An Overview of Cur-
rent Program Models, in Social Work and Child Sexual Abuse 69, J. of Soc. Work & Hum.
Sexuality, Vol. 1 No. 2 (1982) (hereinafter cited as Treating Child Sexual Abuse).
4. These and other areas, however, were analyzed at the ABA's March 1985 National
Policy Conference on Legal Reforms in Child Sexual Abuse Cases, and in that conference's
report, Papers from a National Policy Conference on Legal Reforms in Child Sexual Abuse
Cases (June, 1985).
5. See G. Melton, Child Witnesses and the First Amendment: A Psychological Di-
lemma, in The Child Witness 109, J. Soc. Issues Vol. 40 No. 2 (G. Goodman ed. 1984); G.
Melton, Testimony on the Subject of Child Sexual Abuse Victims in the Courtroom before
the U.S. Senate Subcommittee on Juvenile Justice, Committee on the Judiciary, May 22,
1984.
areas include the effects of pretrial investigation and the trial itself
on the child's performance as a witness; determining what factors
may make some children more vulnerable, e.g., age, type of abuse,
relationship of child to perpetrator, threats, young age, sex; deter-
mining what aspects of the legal process (such as repeated pretrial
questioning, delays, testifying in open court, or in front of the defen-
dant) cause greatest trauma, inhibit reporting, or contribute to a
child's retraction or refusal to testify; and what if any long term ef-
fects legal intervention produces upon children. The experience of
numerous professionals throughout the country who have frequent
contact with children have fueled the recent legislative reform
movement.
In 1981, the National Center on Child Abuse and Neglect
(NCCAN) reported that the average age of a child victim of sexual
abuse was between 11 and 14 years of age; however, it also was
noted that more recent program information showed a higher per-
centage of sexually abused children under age 12, and one program
showed that /3 of the victims were under age six.6 Recent revelations
about sexual abuse of pre-school age children in child care forces us
to accept the fact that very young children are at risk. Further, it
must now be acknowledged that in addition to parental sexual abuse,
a significant amount of sexual abuse is committed by adults outside
of the home. These new problems also raise new legal concerns. In
cases involving offenders who are not parents, such as teachers, day
care providers, or babysitters, the criminal justice system is more
likely to be involved than when the offender is a parent. Although
more incest cases also are being prosecuted in many jurisdictions, a
juvenile court child protection proceeding sometimes is the only legal
intervention in an incest case. Even if criminal prosecution occurs in
an incest case, a special program may exist for offenders who plead
guilty, where they may obtain specialized treatment along with the
child and family under a sentence of work-release or probation.7 The
child in a non-incest case therefore has a greater chance of having to
testify in a criminal proceeding, since more prosecutions and fewer
guilty pleas are likely. In cases with young victims, there may be
greater problems in proving the abuse and consequently, greater
trauma to the child.
Although one may accept the need to reform laws and legal pro-
cedures, the assumptions and purposes underlying proposals need to
be examined, and the legal and practical consequences should be an-
6. Child Sexual Abuse: Incest, Assault and Sexual Exploitation, at 3 National
Center on Child Abuse and Neglect (Rev. April, 1981).
7. See Innovations in the Prosecution of Child Sexual Abuse Cases, American Bar
Association (J. Bulkley ed. 1981); Treating Child Sexual Abuse, supra note 3.
alyzed thoroughly before states adopt innovative approaches. It is
wise to proceed with caution in order to protect against reversals of
convictions by appeals courts based on a statute's unconstitutionality,
to prevent backlash and failure of legislatures to enact reforms for
fear they will be found unconstitutional by the judiciary, and to en-
sure that reforms are narrowly drawn to apply only in cases where it
has been shown that a particular child would be injured by a partic-
ular legal procedure.
III. Approaching the Problems
A state may want to consider adopting a range of legislative
alternatives that permit a court to decide "on a case-by-case basis
whether the state's legitimate concern for the well-being of the mi-
nor victim necessitates" 8 the use of a particular evidentiary or proce-
dural approach. As the U.S. Supreme Court stated in Globe News-
paper Co. v. Superior Court, a case-by-case determination "ensures
that the constitutional right of the press and public to gain access to
criminal trials will not be restricted except where necessary to pro-
tect the State's interest."9 In addition to avoiding constitutional chal-
lenges - whether they involve the first amendment or the rights of a
defendant in criminal trials - a statute that provides "a narrowly
tailored means of accommodating the state's asserted interest" 10 also
assures that an approach is used only when clearly necessary. In
Globe Newspaper, a statute permitting mandatory closure of the
courtroom during the testimony of child sexual abuse victims in a
criminal trial was held to be overly broad, since it would apply
whether or not the victim sought to have closure and even if the
victim would not suffer injury if the proceeding was open to the press
or public.
Indeed, research and clinical evidence suggests that children,
like adults, react differently to being victimized and react differently
to the aftermath and the judicial process." Mandating an approach
for all children could also be interpreted as degrading; although ef-
forts should be made to protect children, efforts also should be di-
rected to treating them equally as adults, where. appropriate. Reform
laws abolishing competency requirements for children often reflect
such an attitude.
It may be wiser to enact reforms in the treatment of child sex-
8. Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596, 608 (1982).
9. Id.
10. id.
11. L. Berliner & M. K. Barbieri, The Testimony of the Child Victim of Sexual As-
sault, in the Child Witness 125, 135, supra note 5; Libai, The Protection of the Child Victim
of a Sexual Offense in the Criminal Justice System, 15 WAYNE L. REV. 977, 1015 (1969); G.
Melton, Child Witnesses and the First Amendment, supra note 5.
ual abuse cases as part of a broader package of special procedures
for any victim of crime who is shown to have specific vulnerabilities
or who is likely to be psychologically harmed by particular legal pro-
cedures. On the one hand, concern for safeguarding the well-being of
young victims may justify special treatment; on the other hand,
many other potentially vulnerable populations, such as developmen-
tally disabled elderly persons, adult persons who have a history of
psychiatric problems, or adult persons who were victimized in an ex-
tremely traumatic crime also may deserve special procedures to re-
duce the trauma they experience in the criminal justice system.
Although it might be better for states to develop a comprehen-
sive legislative scheme for all vulnerable crime victims, this approach
has its shortcomings. First of all, legislatures tend to deal with single
issues and to consider laws that address a specific current problem.
Secondly, it seems improbable that the more radical reforms pro-
posed in child sexual abuse cases could be available for a much
larger category of all vulnerable crime victims. Nevertheless, the
idea of developing special procedures by statute for young victims
may lead other groups to lobby for similar reforms.
Perhaps a more fertile area for research is one involving the
need to study and compare the effects of victimization and legal in-
tervention on a variety of crime victims. One risk with establishing
special approaches for child witnesses without procedures available
for other witnesses is that a social policy of special treatment for a
particular group necessarily excludes other potentially eligible
groups in society. If children do not suffer greater harm than certain
other crime victims, or if other criminal cases are equally difficult to
prove, it seems unwise to develop approaches solely for children.
Furthermore, it may be wise to limit the use of evidentiary and pro-
cedural innovations to cases in which the young victim is, for exam-
ple, under ten years of age. Many statutes that provide for testimony
by videotape or television cover children up to 16, 17 or 18 years of
age.12 Lowering the applicable age limit might eliminate a lot of
children who may be traumatized, but it may be one method of en-
suring that special approaches are used only in the most serious
cases or extraordinary circumstances.
IV. State Legislation Creating a Special Hearsay Exception for a
Child's Complaint of Sexual Abuse
One evidentiary reform attracting attention by state legislatures
is the creation of a special exception to the hearsay rule to permit a
child victim's complaint of sexual abuse to be admitted into evi-
12. Alaska, Arkansas, California, Montana, New Mexico, South Dakota, Wisconsin.
dence. Traditionally, such a statement is hearsay and may not be
admitted to prove the truth of the assertion unless it falls within an
existing hearsay exception. State codes include a variety of excep-
tions for admitting these statements, including the following: (1) ex-
cited utterances or res gestae; (2) statements to physicians; (3) state-
ment of present bodily feelings or symptoms or present sense
impressions; (4) necessity exception; (5) prior consistent statements
(if the child is available to testify); and (6) residual exception. 13 A
child's prompt complaint also may be admitted not as proof of the
truth of the statements but to corroborate the child's in-court testi-
mony to rebut an inference of silence inconsistent with the abusive
act. 14 Yet some states have not adopted all the above exceptions,' 5
and a child's statement may not meet the strict requirements of a
particular traditional exception.
Because of the need for such statements as evidence (direct evi-
dence or other circumstantial evidence may be minimal, and a state-
ment may not fit within an existing exception) eleven states have
adopted by statute a special hearsay exception..(See Appendix A for
list of states.) Although the language and organization of the provi-
sions vary, most statutes allow a child victim's statement to be ad-
mitted if: (1) either the child testifies or is found to be unavailable;
and (2) the court finds the statement to be reliable. Only Illinois and
Vermont allow such statements to corroborate the child's in-court
testimony. Iowa allows statements to be admitted only in juvenile
court child abuse adjudication proceedings and does not require un-
availability or reliability.
Four statutes (Indiana, Minnesota, South Dakota and Washing-
ton) require corroboration or other evidence of the act, in addition to
requiring unavailability of the child and reliability of the statement
before it may be admitted. The purpose of requiring other evidence
in addition to the statement when the child victim's testimony is not
available is to prevent a conviction based upon evidence of the child's
statements alone. The appropriate statutory language should indicate
that after a court finds both unavailability and reliability, and ad-
mits the statement into evidence, there may not be a conviction un-
13. J. Bulkley, Evidentiary Theories for Admitting a Child's Out-of-Court Statement
of Sexual Abuse at Trial, in Child Sexual Abuse and the Law 153 (J. Bulkley, ed. 1981).
14. Id. For more in-depth discussion of the new special exceptions, see Skoler, New
Hearsay Exceptions for a Child's Statement of Sexual Abuse, 18 J. MAR. L. REv. 1 (1984);
Sexual Abuse of Children - Washington's New Hearsay Exception, 58 WASH, L. REv. 813
(1983); A Comprehensive Approach to Child Hearsay Statements in Sex Abuse Cases, 83
COLUM. L. REV. 1745 (1983); J. Pierron, The New Kansas Law Regarding Admissibility of
Child-Victim Hearsay Statements, J. Kan. Bar Assn. 88 (Summer, 1983). See also Papers
from a National Policy Conference on Legal Reforms in Child Sexual Abuse Cases, Ameri-
can Bar Association (June 1985).
15. See, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-460 (1982) with an exhaustive array of statutory
hearsay exceptions.
less other evidence exists in addition to the child's statement. As dis-
cussed below, this may not be necessary, since a prosecution is
unlikely to be commenced with only the child's statement. On the
other hand, a state may want to include this requirement to ensure
that defendants receive a fair trial.
Under the new exceptions, if the child testifies at trial, the prior
statement can be admitted as substantive evidence; however, the
child's testimony is sufficient to convict without the statement, and
the statement merely serves to corroborate the in-court testimony. In
cases where the child cannot testify, the necessity for these state-
ments is much greater. Situations where the child may not be able to
testify include cases involving extremely young victims (such as two
or three-year olds) who may not be able to communicate or remem-
ber what happened to them, or other children who would be highly
traumatized emotionally from testifying or intimidated by the defen-
dant into not testifying."6 As noted above, the problem with these
cases is that if the child does not testify and the sole evidence is the
victim's out-of-court statement, it is unlikely that the state would
bring a case. But where circumstantial evidence in addition to the
statement is available, a prosecutor could decide that there is suffi-
cient evidence to convict the defendant beyond a reasonable doubt.
Despite the hope that these new exceptions bring toward in-
creasing the number of prosecutions and convictions, in cases where
the child does not testify and is not subject to cross-examination,
admissibility of statements under the new exceptions may be jeop-
ardized under the confrontation clause of the sixth amendment.
17
The confrontation clause has been interpreted as a rule of preference
for "face-to-face confrontation at trial," requiring the "personal
presence of the witness at trial, enabling the trier to observe his de-
meanor as an aid in evaluating his credibility and making false accu-
sation more unlikely because of the presence of the accused and the
solemnity of the occasion."'" If, however, the declarant's live testi-
mony in court cannot be obtained, principles of necessity and public
policy have been invoked to admit some hearsay statements.' 9
It would be not enough, however, for the prosecutor simply not
to call or produce the child victim to testify at trial. Indeed, the U.S.
Supreme Court in the 1980 decision of Ohio v. Roberts held that to
satisfy the confrontation clause, the "prosecution must either pro-
duce, or demonstrate the unavailability of, the declarant whose state-
16. See L. Berliner & M.K. Barbieri, supra note II; U.S. v. Carlson, 547 F.2d 1346
(8th Cir. 1976); State v. Sheppard, I 0822-12-83 (N.J. Super. Ct. Sept. 27, 1984).
17. U.S. CONST. amend. Vi.
18. MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE § 252, at 606 (1972).
19. Mattox v. U.S., 156 U.S. 237 (1895).
ment it wishes to use against the defendant."2 Thus as noted earlier,
if the child is available and testifies at trial, the statement may be
admitted under a special exception as a prior consistent statement
with no further inquiry.
If a prosecutor chose not to produce the child victim as a wit-
ness, however, two requirements must be met under Ohio v. Roberts
to satisfy the confrontation clause. In addition to unavailability the
statement must possess indicia of reliability. Both of these require-
ments are discussed in greater detail below.
A. Unavailability
Most of the new hearsay exceptions require a showing of the
declarant's unavailability before the statement may be admitted.
Traditional categories of unavailability include death, absence, phys-
ical disability, mental infirmity or insanity, failure of memory, re-
fusal to testify, privilege, or supervening disqualification. 2 Unavaila-
bility of the witness at trial also is a requirement for admitting
hearsay under certain traditional exceptions, including dying decla-
rations, statements against interest, and former testimony. (Most ex-
ceptions allow hearsay to be admitted even if the declarant does not
testify at trial.)
There is, however, a higher standard of unavailability for consti-
tutional purposes. The Supreme Court has addressed the issue only
in the context of a declarant's absence from the jurisdiction, holding
that the prosecution must make a "good faith effort" to obtain the
presence of the witness at trial.22 The Court also has indicated in the
Ohio v. Roberts decision that the "lengths to which the prosecution
must go to produce the witness is a question of reasonableness."2 "
Until the Supreme Court decides the issue, this is the only guide for
courts in deciding what is a sufficient showing of unavailability to
satisfy the confrontation clause.
In child sexual abuse cases, a child is likely to be unavailable
under the categories of mental infirmity (which may encompass psy-
chological harm),24 failure of memory,25 refusal to testify (based on
threats of harm to the child by the defendant), 26 and incompe-
20. Ohio v. Roberts, 448" U.S. 55, 65 (1979).
21. MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE § 253, at 608 (1972).
22. Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719 (1968).
23. Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. at 74.
24. See People v. Stritzinger, 34 Cal.3d 441, 668 P.2d 738 (1983); Hochheiser v. Supe-
rior Court, No. 5005940 (Cal. Ct. App. Nov. 9, 1984) (affirmed during week of Feb. 11, 1985
by California Supreme Court); People v. Gomez, 103 Cal. Rptr. 80, 26 Cal. App.3d 225
(1972); Warren v. U.S., 436 A.2d 821, (D.C. 1981).
25. See U.S. v. Iron Shell, 633 F.2d 77 (8th Cir. 1980); State v. McCafferty, #14350
(S.D. Oct. 3, 1984); State v. Slider, No. 12888-4-1 (Wash. Ct. App. Sept. 24, 1984).
26. See, e.g., Rice v. Marshall, 709 F.2d 1100 (6th Cir. 1983); U.S. v. Carlson, 547
tency.27 Rather than declare a child incompetent, courts have some-
times established a special type of unavailability for very young child
sexual abuse victims who cannot be meaningfully cross-examined, al-
though they are present at trial and take the witness stand.28 Thus,
prosecutors may be able to obtain admission of statements both in
cases where the child does not take the witness stand at all, or where
the child "freezes up" on the stand, and becomes unavailable be-
cause of failure of memory, or simply a refusal or inability to con-
tinue testifying. Showing unavailability, however, may not always be
easy. One court, for example, found that the evidence presented es-
tablished only that the witnesses' mental, emotional, and physical
condition rendered her ability to testify merely inconvenient and not
relatively impossible. 9
One special exception statute in Indiana specifically defines un-
availability of a child sexual abuse victim, providing that a child is
unavailable if:
(i) a psychiatrist has certified that the child's participation in
the trial would be a traumatic experience; (ii) a physician has
certified that the child cannot participate in the trial for medical
reasons; or (iii) the court has determined that the child is inca-
pable of understanding the nature and obligation of an oath. 0
States that have adopted or are considering special exceptions should
include definitions or refer to other sections of their code regarding
unavailability.31 How unavailability should be shown also should be
specified, including the requirement of a hearing on the issue and the
making of a trial record. A hearing should be held, for example, on a
child's incompetency if that is the basis of unavailability alleged by
the prosecutor. Holding a hearing ensures factual support for the
trial court's finding and gives an appellate court a basis with which
to uphold the trial court's determination.
California courts have held that unavailability due to psycholog-
ical harm can be established only by an expert, not a lay witness.
32
Thus, when seeking to admit statements when the child is alleged to
be unavailable due to severe psychological harm from testifying, a
F.2d 1346 (8th Cir. 1976); State v. Sheppard, #0822-12-83 (N.J. Super. Sept. 27, 1984).
27. See Indiana statute, Appendix A; State v. Ryan, No. 50216-1 (Wash. S. Ct. Nov.
26, 1984).
28. U.S. v. Iron Shell, 633 F.2d 77 (8th Cir. 1980); U.S. v. Nick, 604 F.2d 1199 (9th
Cir. 1979); State v. McCafferty, #14350 (S.D. Oct. 3, 1984).
29. People v. Williams, 155 Cal. Rptr. 414 (1979).
30. See Appendix A.
31. Warren v. U.S., 436 A.2d 821 (D.C. 1981). This case notes that nineteen states
have statutes with mental infirmity as a category of unavailability and includes an excellent
discussion on psychological harm from testifying as an unavailability basis for admitting prior
testimony.
32. See, e.g., People v. Stritzinger, 34 Cal.3d 441, 668 P.2d 738 (Cal. 1983).
mental health professional who has had direct experience with the
child should testify to emotional problems of the child and that such
problems would be seriously exacerbated by testifying in court. Indi-
ana's statute is a good example of specifying a requirement for ex-
pert testimony, although California has added a category of unavail-
ability that defines an expert as "a physician, surgeon, psychiatrist,
licensed psychologist, licensed clinical social worker, or licensed mar-
riage family or child counselor.""3
B. Reliability
As noted previously, in order to protect an accused's constitu-
tional right to confront witnesses, a second requirement also must be
met before a child's statement may be admitted under the new ex-
ceptions. In Ohio v. Roberts, the U.S. Supreme Court indicated that
after a witness is shown to be unavailable, a statement may be ad-
mitted only if it has "sufficient indicia of reliability"; such reliability
"can be inferred without more in a case where the evidence falls
within a firmly rooted hearsay exception. In other cases, the evi-
dence must be excluded, at least absent a showing of particularized
guarantees of trustworthiness."34 Thus, if a statement does not fall
within a "firmly rooted exception," a court can nevertheless admit
the statement under a special exception if the statement is shown to
possess particularized guarantees of trustworthiness.
As with the showing of unavailability, factors showing trustwor-
thiness may not be easy to establish. Indeed, it is preferable for pros-
ecutors to seek admissibility of hearsay statements of child sexual
abuse victims under one or more of the long-standing or accepted
exceptions. A court would be likely to admit a statement under a
traditional exception in order to avoid making particularized findings
of trustworthiness. South Dakota's statute, for example, makes a
statement admissible under the new exception only if it is not admis-
sible under any other statute or exception."
In seeking admissibility under the new exception, a prosecutor
should first attempt to show that the statement satisfied one or more
criteria cited in the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Dutton v. Ev-
ans. 6 The Dutton criteria are: (1) The statement contains no express
assertion of past fact; (2) cross-examination could not show the de-
clarant's lack of knowledge; (3) the possibility of declarant's faulty
recollection is remote; and (4) the circumstances surrounding the
33. Cal. Evid. Code § 240 (amended and effective January 1, 1985, Assem. Bill No.
3840, Stats. 1984, ch. 401).
34. Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. at 66 (emphasis added).
35. See S.D.C.L.A. § 19-16-38 (1984).
36. Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74 (1970).
statement are such that there is no reason to suppose the declarant
misrepresented the defendant's involvement.
Courts have held that all four Dutton factors need not be pre-
sent in order to admit a statement over confrontation objections, and
in fact, if other factors indicate reliability, a statement need not sat-
isfy any of the elements."' Prosecutors also should marshall facts to
satisfy criteria cited by other courts as indicating a statement's trust-
worthiness, including the following:
(1) whether there is an apparent motive to lie;
(2) the general character of the declarant;
(3) whether more than one person heard the statements;
(4) whether the statements were spontaneous or directly re-
sponsive to questions;
(5) the timing of the declaration;
(6) the relationship of speaker and declarant;
(7) the child's young age makes it unlikely the child
fabricated where the statement represents a graphic ac-
count beyond the child's experience;
(8) the nature and duration of the abuse;
(9) the relationship of declarant and defendant;
(10) the statement has a "ring of verity" and terminology ap-
propriate to the child's age; I
(11) the child was suffering pain or distress when making
statement; and
(12) extrinsic evidence exists to show defendant's opportunity
to commit the act complained of in child's statement;
(13) certainty that the statement was made, based on an as-
sessment of the child's credibility in court;]
(14) assurance of personal knowledge of the event;
(15) partiality of the child because of interest, bias, coercion
or corruption. 8
V. Alternative Approaches for Avoiding the Child Victim's Testi-
mony in Open Court Where Necessary to Prevent Severe Emotional
Trauma or When the Child is Otherwise Not Available as a Witness
The ABA Recommendations state the following regarding the
testimony of child sexual abuse victims:
1.4.4. Child's Testimony
In criminal cases, a child sexual abuse victim should testify at
preliminary hearings or grand jury proceedings only if needed.
Where necessary to prevent trauma to the child, procedures
37. U.S. v. Perez, 658 F.2d 654 (8th Cir. 1981).
38. See U.S. v. Perez, 658 F.2d at 661 n. 6; U.S. v. Iron Shell, 633 F.2d at 87; U.S. v.
Nick, 604 F.2d at 1199; State v. Ryan, No. 50216-1; State v. McCafferty, #14350 (S.D. Oct.
3, 1984); Bertrang v. State, 50 Wis. 2d 702, 184 N.W.2d 867 (1971).
should be developed to avoid the need for the child's testimony
in open court in criminal and civil trials, taking into account any
constitutional limitations.
Testifying in a formal courtroom at a criminal trial in front of the
defendant, jury, judge and an audience of spectators, and being sub-
jected to direct and cross-examination often is cited as one of the
most intimidating and stressful aspects of the legal process for chil-
dren. 9 Although such an experience also may be anxiety-producing
for adults, adults generally have developed coping mechanisms to
deal with such situations. Further, adults have a general understand-
ing of the purpose and operation of our legal system and should be
better able to withstand and deal with a defense attorney's efforts to
discredit their testimony.
The choice of alternatives for taking a child's testimony should
depend upon the needs and problems of a particular child. For some
children, testifying in front of the defendant may not be as traumatic
as sitting on the witness stand in a formal courtroom with an audi-
ence full of strangers and the press or with the jury present. A video-
taped deposition with the defendant present may be the proper
mechanism for such a child. In juvenile court child protection cases
there is no jury and the public is excluded, and in some cases, a child
may be interviewed in the judge's chambers (generally with the par-
ent alleged to have committed the abuse present). This would pro-
vide a less formal setting in which the child may be examined and
cross-examined. Other children may not be disturbed by'testifying in
the presence of the public or the jury, but terrified of facing the
defendant. Still other children may only require an advocate, close
friend or relative in order to feel less traumatized. Finally, some chil-
dren may find testifying a helpful experience in dealing with the
abuse and may not be traumatized at all.
For the above reasons, legislatures adopting innovative ap-
proaches should not mandate a particular approach for all child vic-
tims, such as excusing all children from testifying, closing the court-
room in all cases when a child testifies, or preventing the child from
seeing the defendant in all cases during the child's testimony. In-
deed, the U.S. Supreme Court in Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior
Court held that mandatory exclusion of the press during the testi-
mony of a child sexual abuse victim was violative of the first
amendment.' 0
A number of states have enacted or are considering legislation
allowing alternatives for taking the testimony of a child sexual abuse
39. See sources cited supra note 2.
40. 457 U.S. 596 (1982).
victim in order to prevent the child from having to testify in open
court at trial, including testimony by videotape or closed-circuit tele-
vision. States, however, should adopt legislation allowing the use of
such alternatives. A California appeals court skirted the constitu-
tional issues and disallowed the use of closed-circuit television for
taking a child's trial testimony because specific authorization for
such a procedure had not been granted by state statute, a necessity
given the serious constitutional issues raised by the procedure.41
Other courts, however, have allowed such alternatives without legis-
lative authority, or at least have addressed the constitutional issues
despite the absence of legislation.42 For example, where no legislative
authority existed, some courts have allowed a child sexual abuse vic-
tim to testify in court with the defendant hidden from the child's
view, although courts have held such a procedure to be violative of
the defendant's right of confrontation.43
A. Videotaped Testimony or Deposition
States seem to be most interested in statutes to allow videotap-
ing of a child's testimony. In 1982, the ABA's Child Sexual Abuse
Project found that four (4) states allowed videotaped testimony. By
1985, fourteen (14) states had statutes permitting videotaped trial or
preliminary hearing testimony. (See Appendix A for states.) Six (6)
of the 14 statutes permit the videotape to be made or admitted into
evidence at trial only if the court finds that the child's testimony in
open court would cause severe emotional trauma." Three (3) of
these statutes allow either the videotape to be made or to be admit-
ted at trial if the court finds the child to be "medically unavailable"
because testimony would cause emotional trauma, or otherwise "un-
available" as defined in a state's evidence code sections relating to
the admissibility of hearsay or prior testimony."5 The remaining stat-
utes simply give the court discretion to order the making of the
videotape. Thirteen (13) specifically allow cross-examination or
questioning of the child by the defendant or his lawyer.
Twelve (12) statutes require the physical presence of the defen-
41. Hochheiser v. Superior Court, No. 5005940 (Cal. Ct. App. Nov. 9, 1984).
42. See U.S. v. Benfield, 593 F.2d 815 (8th Cir. 1979) (videotaped deposition with
defendant in a different room and not seen by witness); State v. Sheppard #10822-12-83 (N.J.
Super. Sept. 27, 1984) (closed-circuit television); State v. Hutchins, 286 So. 2d 244 (Fla.
1973) (videotaped deposition). See also Washington Post, Nov. 14, 1984 "Judge Says Girl, 4
Must Face Father in Sex Abuse Trial" disallowing closed circuit television as a violation of the
defendant's right to confront witnesses.
43. See State v. Strable, 313 N.W. 2d 497 (Iowa 1981) (upheld); Herbert v. Superior
Court, 172 Cal. Rptr. 850 117 Cal. App.3d 132 (1981) (struck down).
44. California, Colorado, Florida, Maine, South Dakota, and Wisconsin (Florida and
Wisconsin only require a finding by the court when the videotape is made).
45. California, Colorado and South Dakota.
dant in the room where the videotaping takes place; the statutes in
Kentucky and Texas mandate that the defendant be hidden from the
child's view, although the defendant must be able to see and hear the
child. The age of the child varies by statute, although all provisions
allow videotaping of children under 12 years of age.
B. Live Testimony of the Child by Closed-Circuit Television
Three (3) states, Kentucky, Louisiana, and Texas, have statutes
permitting closed-circuit television of a child's testimony. (See Ap-
pendix A.) All of these laws are structured along similar lines. Dur-
ing the trial, the child is questioned by the prosecutor and defense
attorney (with a support person allowed to be present) in a room
outside the courtroom, which is televised to the judge, jury and pub-
lic in the courtroom. The defendant must be able/to "observe and
hear the testimony of the child in person," but the child may not see
or hear the defendant. Only Louisiana conditions the use of this pro-
cedure "when justice so requires."
A bill in California, which has passed the state senate, proposes
two-way television of the child's testimony, which may be utilized if
psychological harm to the child from testimony in open court is
shown. Under this bill, the child would be in a room outside the
courtroom, and the judge, jury, defendant, and both attorneys would
be in the courtroom. The child would be able to see the courtroom
by television, and the people in the courtroom can see the child by
television, and only a support person wouldbe permitted with the
child. This proposal thus differs from the other laws by allowing the
child to see the courtroom and the jury, judge, public and defendant,
but permits the questioning to occur by television rather than in the
child's presence.
C. Potential Constitutional and Other Problems With Alternative
Procedures for Taking a Child's Testimony
The above statutory alternatives may create a number of consti-
tutional violations, many of which have been analyzed by various law
journal articles. 46 As noted earlier, careful consideration of these is-
sues is advised in order to avoid reversals of convictions and to pre-
vent retrials. When a significant number of states have passed legis-
lation dealing with an area of great concern to the public such as
child sexual abuse, the natural inclination to follow the trend should
46. See Brakel, Videotape in Trial Proceedings: A Technological Obsession, 61 ABA
J. 956 (Aug. 1975); Doret, Trial by Videotape - Can Justice Be Seen to be Done?, 47 Temp.
L.Q. 228 (1973-74); Comment, Libai's Child Courtroom: Is is Constitutional?, 7 J. Juv. L. 31
(1983); Comment, The Criminal Videotape Trial: Serious Constitutional Questions, 55 OR.
L. REV. 567 (1976); An Evaluation of Video-Tape Trials, 26 Stan. L. Rev. 619 (1974).
be tempered by evaluating the issue in terms of both its constitution-
ality as well as its practicality.
The constitutional issues raised by the new videotaping and
closed-circuit television statutes include the defendant's right to a
fair trial under the due process clause of the fourteenth amend-
ment, the defendant's sixth amendment right to a public trial and
to a trial by jury,48 the defendant's sixth amendment right to con-
front witnesses,49 and the public's (and press') first amendment right
to attend criminal trials. 50 Commentators have suggested that the
defendant's jury trial right may be infringed, even if the videotaping
is shown to the jury later, because it interferes with the jury's deci-
sionmaking function by distorting or not fully conveying evidence,
especially a witness' demeanor; it denies the jury's power at common
law to question witnesses; and "it compromises the integrity of the
court." 1
The defendant's right to a fair trial under the 14th amendment
due process clause "traditionally has required judge and jury to be
unbiased and evidence to be trustworthy." 52 The use of videotaping
may prevent the jury from making an accurate and unbiased deci-
sion decision if the videotaping medium prejudicially alters or does
not convey evidence. Moreover, the truth-eliciting aspects of the jury
trial are removed when videotaping is used, enhancing the possibility
of unfairness or perjury.58
As with the jury trial right, the defendant's right to a public
trial and the right of the press and public to attend criminal trials
may be infringed even if the videotape is shown later to the public.
Commentators have cited a number of reasons to support this con-
tention, such as the fact that witnesses "may speak more truthfully
if placed before the scrutiny of their peers," and that confidence in
judicial remedies may lead to public skepticism of judicial processes
if the videotaping is done privately.
54
The first amendment right of access to criminal trials by the
press and public has been analyzed in depth elsewhere.55 The issue
has reached the U.S. Supreme Court, which held in Globe Newspa-
per that mandatory closure of the courtroom during the victim's tes-
timony violated the first amendment. Statutes in many states allow
47. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
48. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
49. Id.
50. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
51. 55 OR. L. REV. at 578.
52. Id. at 582.
53. Id. at 583.
54. Id. at 573.
55. See Parker, The Child Witness Versus the Press: A Proposed Legislative Response
to Globe v. Superior Court, 47 ALB. L. REv. 408 (1983); G. Melton, supra note 5.
closure within the discretion of the court, which should pass constitu-
tional muster. Videotaped testimony shown later to the press and
public also should not be violative of the first amendment as long as
they are not mandated by statute.
The defendant's sixth amendment right to confront witnesses in
a criminal trial also may be violated unless certain requirements are
met before using videotaped testimony or closed circuit television.
Generally, closed circuit television or videotaping of the child's testi-
mony is sought where it is believed that if the child testifies, she will
suffer serious emotional harm or will be so terrified that she will
refused to talk or will "freeze up" because of the courtroom setting
or personal threats by the defendant. Depositions frequently have
been used in situations where it is impossible to obtain the witness'
personal presence at trial. One commentator notes three types of un-
availability: the witness is not available for legal process (e.g. death,
absence); available for process, but not available for actual attend-
ance (e.g., illness); or available for process and attendance but not
available for testifying. It is the third category that justifies vide-
otaping or television for taking the child's testimony.56
Necessity is the basic principle for the use of depositions and
former testimony at trial and for the use of closed circuit television.
If the witness's testimony in court cannot be had, "it will be lost
entirely for the purposes of doing justice if it is not received in the
form in which it survives and can be had. The only inquiry then,
need be: Is his testimony in court unavailable?" 57 Thus, in order to
admit videotaped testimony in lieu of the child's testimony in court,
the requirement of unavailability first must be met. As with special
hearsay exceptions, unavailability categories include death, absence,
physical or mental disability, incompetency at trial, failure of mem-
ory, and refusal to testify.58 As some statutes provide, severe psycho-
logical trauma to the child from testifying also may be a proper
ground, although statutes that allow a videotaped deposition to be
admitted based on any of the above grounds of unavailability are
preferable.
As noted earlier, Ohio v. Roberts also requires that the deposi-
tion possess indicia of reliability, either by falling within a tradi-
tional hearsay exception or having particularized guarantees of trust-
worthiness.59  In analyzing the videotaping legislation, both
requirements of Ohio v. Roberts must be considered. The eight (8)
statutes that do not require unavailability to be demonstrated proba-
56. WIGMORE, WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE § 1402 at 204 (1974).
57. Id. at 203.
58. See text accompanying note 21, supra.
59. See text accompanying note 34, supra.
bly violate the confrontation clause. Those statutes that require a
finding of the child's unavailability, and require the testimony to be
taken in accordance with the state's hearsay exception for former
testimony should be constitutional. Statutes requiring a showing of
unavailability and cross-examination in the defendant's presence also
should satisfy confrontation requirements. Cross-examination and
the defendant's presence clearly fulfill the trustworthiness require-
ment, and courts have allowed videotaped depositions in other cases
where a witness was unable to attend the trial where these elements
were present.60 As discussed below, however, statutes that attempt to
hide the defendant from the child's view may not be constitutional
under the confrontation clause of the U.S. Constitution or under
state constitutions if the defendant's right to be confronted with the
witnesses against him is considered a right to physical, face-to-face
confrontation with the witness.
The closed-circuit television laws in Kentucky and Texas do not
require a showing similar to unavailability. Louisiana allows the pro-
cedure "when justice so requires." Since testimony by television
should not be considered hearsay, unavailability may not be the test.
Nevertheless, courts may require a showing of necessity or "ex-
traordinary" or other circumstances similar to unavailability to jus-
tify restriction of a constitutional right. 1 The California Supreme
Court recently upheld the Hochheiser decision which borrowed lan-
guage from the Globe case and stated that "a compelling state inter-
est" must be shown to permit two-way television.
The videotaping and closed-circuit television statutes in Ken-
tucky, Louisiana, and Texas also do not permit the child to see the
defendant, although the defendant must be in the room and be able
to see the child. The issue is whether cross-examination without
physical confrontation of the child is sufficient to satisfy the trust-
worthiness requirement. If confrontation is interpreted to mean that
the witness and defendant must face each other physically, as some
courts have held, 62 these statutes would be unconstitutional. The
purpose underlying the face-to-face requirement is that the witness is
less likely to make a false accusation while in the presence of the
accused. This purpose clearly is not met if the child cannot see the
defendant, even though the defendant can see the child. Moreover,
almost half the state constitutions give the defendant a right to meet
witnesses against him "face-to-face," which may be literally inter-
60. U.S. v. Singleton, 460 F.2d 1148, 1153 (2d Cir. 1972); State v. Hewett, 545 P. 2d
1201, 1204 (Wash. 1976); State v. Hutchins, 286 So. 2d at 246.
61. U.S. v. Benfield, 593 F.2d at 822; Hochheiser v. Superior Court, No. B005940, at
28.
62. Herbert v. Superior Court, 172 Cal. Rptr. 850 (Cal. Ct. App. 1981); U.S. v. Ben-
field, 593 F.2d at 822.
preted by courts; indeed, a trial court in Kentucky recently struck
down the state's videotaping statute because it does not permit face-
to-face confrontation of the child witness and the defendant as re-
quired by the Kentucky. constitution."3
The above closed circuit television or videotaping provisions
may guarantee trustworthiness by providing an opportunity for
cross-examination, permitting the defendant to see the child, and
showing the videotape or televising the testimony to the jury and
public, despite the fact that the child cannot see the accused. A trial
court in New Jersey upheld an approach where the defendant was in
the courtroom with the judge, jury and public, who could view the
child by a television monitor, although the child had no view into the
courtroom." Further, in a child sexual abuse prosecution, the Iowa
Supreme Court allowed the defendant to be hidden from the view of
the child witness during the child's testimony and rejected a confron-
tation challenge because there was cross-examination and the jury
could observe the demeanor of the witness while testifying.68 Unlike
the Iowa situation, with the above videotaping and television laws,
the child is not testifying in open court in the presence of the judge
and jury. The jury does not have the opportunity to observe the
child's demeanor during the videotaped deposition or preliminary
hearing, although they may view it later. Although the jury may see
the child testifying on television with the closed-circuit television ap-
proach, the problems cited earlier with distorted or excluded evi-
dence are still present. As the Hochheiser decision noted, " . . . use
of closed circuit television may affect the jurors' impressions of the
witness demeanor and credibility."
It is possible that a court may hold that cross-examination alone
fulfills the trustworthiness requirement, and satisfies the confronta-
tion clause without the defendant's physical presence. One commen-
tator notes:
If there has been a cross-examination, there has been a confron-
tation. The satisfaction of the right of cross-examination dis-
poses of any objection based on the so-called right of
confrontation.66
Professor Wigmore further states that requiring the witness' personal
appearance enables the jury and judge to observe the demeanor of
the witness while testifying; it does not mean the opponent and wit-
63. Commonwealth v. Willis, No. 84CR346 (Ky. Cir. Ct. Feb. 20, 1985); See WIG-
MORE, WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE § 1397, at 155 for a list of state constitution confrontation
clauses.
64. State v. Sheppard, #10822-12-83 (N.J. Super. Sept. 27, 1984).
65. State v. Strable, 313 N.W. 2d 497 (Iowa 1981).
66. WIGMORE, 5 WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE § 1396, at 154.
ness must be confronted, but that the witness must be present before
the tribunal. 67 This element can be satisfied by videotaping or televi-
sion (albeit with the drawbacks noted above).
If however, a court considers face-to-face confrontation indis-
pensable, two-way closed-circuit television may be valid as long as
confrontation is interpreted to mean that the defendant and witness
only must see each other. The Supreme Court of Missouri allowed
two-way closed circuit television for an expert's testimony, holding
that while the witness was not physically present in the courtroom,
"his image and voice were there . . . for the defendant to see and
hear and, by the same means, simultaneously for him to be seen and
heard by the witness."' 68 In a 1979 case, moreover, a videotaped dep-
osition was held to be unconstitutional where physical face-to-face
confrontation was absent, although the court noted: "Today's deci-
sion should not be regarded as prohibiting the development of elec-
tronic video technology in litigation. . . . [W]here the procedure
more nearly approximates the traditional courtroom setting, our ap-
proval might be forthcoming." '69 The court went on to say, "It is
possible that face-to-face confrontation through two-way closed cir-
cuit television might be adequate," although concern was expressed
that no showing of "extraordinary circumstances" was made in the
Missouri decision." Although at least one Florida trial court is
known to have allowed two-way television in a child sexual abuse
proceeding, 7' the recent Hochheiser California Supreme Court deci-
sion noted serious constitutional problems with two-way television,
including violations of the defendant's right to a jury trial and a fair
trial, as well as of the right of confrontation.
Another potential problem is that some statutes do not require a
finding of unavailability at the time of trial when the videotape is
sought to be admitted in lieu of the personal appearance of the child,
but only require a finding of unavailability to make the videotape. To
satisfy the confrontation clause, it may be that unavailability must
be established not just at the time of the taking of the videotape, but
at trial, particularly if the witness' condition may have changed. 2
Colorado requires a showing of unavailability both to make and to
admit the videotape. Many state criminal procedure rules require
67. Id.
68. Kansas City v. McCoy, 525 S.W. 2d 336 (Mo. 1975).
69. U.S. v. Benfield, 593 F.2d at 821-22.
70. Id. at 822 n. II.
71. See Papers from a National Policy Conference on Legal Reforms in Child Sexual
Abuse Cases, supra note 14.
72. MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE § 253, at 612-13 (1972). Indeed, U.S. v. Benfield noted its
concern that only a marginal showing of unavailability was made at trial and no new evidence
was presented. The court said "an additional showing of the witness' mental condition and
availability on the trial date would have been a much better practice." 593 F.2d at 817 n. 4.
two showings. 73
One problem that requires attention is that most statutes that
allow pre-trial depositions or videotaping of preliminary hearing tes-
timony do not permit an additional deposition if new evidence is dis-
covered between the original videotape and the trial. (South Dakota,
however, allows a second tape). Unless the videotaping occurs during
the trial, moreover, an additional deposition frequently may be nec-
essary, which would result in one more time a child must be ques-
tioned. Thus, states may want to consider requiring the videotaping
after the trial has begun, as is required in Florida's statute, to avoid
greater trauma to a child who is forced to be fully cross-examined a
second time when unavailability is not established prior to trial.
VI. Conclusion and Emerging Issues
A number of areas relating to child victims in the legal system
remain to be explored. This article addresses a few issues designed to
help improve prosecutions of child sexual abuse and to prevent psy-
chological trauma to children who testify.
Cases of child sexual abuse are being litigated in various judi-
cial forums. In addition to civil child protection actions which may
be filed in cases involving a parent, other possible legal actions in-
clude civil protective order proceedings, custody and divorce actions,
and civil tort suits seeking money damages against perpetrators or
against institutions, such as school systems, for hiring or maintaining
an employee who sexually abuses children. These suits are becoming
more prevalent, and many of them have resulted in settlements of
hundreds of thousands of dollars for the victims. 74 Several attorneys
have developed law practices or reputations in handling these cases.2
When child sexual abuse is an issue in a custody case, signifi-
cant problems are presented. Conflicts between the parents must be
considered when examining an allegation of sexual abuse in divorce
cases. In some cases, it has been alleged that courts believe that the
mother is vindictive by alleging sexual abuse, and award custody or
generous visitation privileges to the father, who in fact may have
sexually abused the child. On the other hand, cases now are coming
to light in which it is believed that some parents have manipulated
their child into claiming sexual abuse to prevent the other parent
from having contact with or custody of the child. Moreover, when an
73. See, e.g., MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE § 253, at 612 n. 55, § 613 n. 56; WIGMORE, 5
WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE § 1411 (1974).
74. The ABA's Child Sexual Abuse Law Reform Project has a file with pleadings from
a substantial lawsuit in Louisiana, as well as newspaper articles of a major lawsuit settled in
Virginia and several others around the U.S.
75. L.A. Times, May 21, 1982, "Incest: The Victim Fights Back, Some Fle Suits for
Damages."
allegation is made, how it is handled in the family court in a custody
proceeding may be problematic, since judges may not be as knowl-
edgeable about sexual abuse of children as their counterparts in ju-
venile or criminal court. In many custody cases, whether the parent
sexually abused the child often is not separately proven or deter-
mined. Thus, in Maryland, a bill was enacted into law in 1984 re-
quiring the court in a divorce or custody case to make a finding by a
preponderance of the evidence regarding a sexual abuse allegation
before it makes a custody award to either parent. 7 A survey of prac-
tices as well as legal research and analysis in this area would be
helpful to domestic relations lawyers and family court judges.
Greater awareness and prosecutions mean that statistically
more children may retract their stories (although some actually may
be false retractions). Hopefully, this should result in more careful
and thorough investigations before cases are filed. Further, as with
any other crime, there will be some false reports or witnesses who
lie. As one commentator has noted in discussing one of the question-
able assumptions underlying the corroboration requirement for child
sex offense prosecutions (now abolished in all jurisdictions):
• .. It is estimated that most sexual offenses are never re-
ported to the authorities. Those authorities who support the as-
sumption cite only isolated examples of false complaints, many
of which were by persons suffering from severe psychiatric dis-
turbances. Existing statistics indicate that the frequency of
"false" reports for sex offenses approximates the frequency of
false reports for other crimes.
7
Indeed, at least one researcher notes that "there is little correlation
between age and honesty .. .children are no more prone to lying
than adults.
'78
Although much as been learned and many changes made during
the last five to ten years, reforms are still needed. New methods to
protect children nevertheless must be considered in the context of
our constitutional system that values liberty and assumes an individ-
ual innocent until proven guilty by the state. The current media at-
tention focusing on the problems involving child witnesses eventually
will die down. At that time, there may be greater objectivity and
recognition that the current reform movement contributed to more
effective handling of cases, more guilty persons prosecuted and con-
victed and, hopefully, fewer children traumatized.
76. Md. Code Ann. § 9-101 Family Law Article (Oct. 1, 1984).
77. D. Lloyd, The Corroboration of Sexual Victimization of Children, in Child Sexual
Abuse and the Law 103, American Bar Association (J. Bulkley ed. 1981).
78. G. Melton, J. Bulkley & D. Wulkin, Competency of Children as Witnesses, in
Child Sexual Abuse and the Law, supra note 77 at 125, 136-38.
Appendix A*
Chart I
States With Statutes For Videotaping
And Closed-Circuit Television Of A Child's Testimony
As of May, 1985**































ALASKA STAT. § 12.45.047 (1982)
ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-2311 (1978)
ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 43-2035 to 2037
(1981, 1983)
CAL. PENAL CODE § 1346 (1983)
COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-3-413
FLA. STAT. § 918.17 (1984)
(Recently enacted)
KY. REV. STAT. § 421.350 (1984)
(Recently enacted)
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, §1205 (1983)
MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 46-15-401 to 403
(1977)
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-9-17 and N.M. R.
Cr. P.R. 29.1 (1980)
(Recently enacted - No cite yet)
(Recently enacted)
S.D. CODIFIED LAws ANN. § 23A-12-9
(1983)
TEX. CRIM. PROC. CODE ANN. § 38.071
(1983)









KY. REV. STAT. § 431.350(3) (1984)
LA. REV. STAT. 15:260 (1984)
(Recently enacted)
TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art.
38.071(3) (1983)
Bills Pending
California (passed State Senate)
Ohio
Chart 3
States With A Special Hearsay Exception for a Child's















ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-1416 (1984-
85)
COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-3-411(3)
Ill. 83rd Gen. Assem. P.A. 83-1067 Sec.
115-10 and Ill. Stat. Ann. Ch. 37, § 704-
6(4)(c)
IND. CODE § 35-37-4-6 (1984)
IOWA CODE ANN. § 232.96(6) (1984-85)
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-460(dd) (1982)
MINN. STAT. § 595.02(3) (1984)
S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 19-16-38
(1984)
UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-411 (1983)
(Recently enacted)
WASH. REV. CODE § 9A.44.120 (1982)
Chart 4
Special Exception for Videopated Interviews of Child Sexual Abuse Victims - 4 States
State





IOWA CODE § 232.96(6)(Supp. 1984).
Ky. REV. STAT. § 421.350(1)(2) (1984)
LA. REV. STAT. 15:440.1-.6 (1984)
TEx. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art.
38.071(1), (2) (1983)
Chart 5
States With Statutes or Rules Eliminating Competency Qualification



























ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-2202
ARK. STAT. ANN. § 28-1001
COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-90-106(l)(b)
R. Evid. 601
FLA. STAT. § 90.601
IOWA CODE § 622.1
MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 9-
101
MICH. STAT. ANN. § 27A.2163
MIss. CODE ANN. § 13-1-3
Mo. REV. STAT. § 491.060(2)
NEB. REV. STAT. § 27-601
NEV. REV STAT. § 50.015
N.J. REV. STAT. § 2A:81-1
R. Evid. 601
R. Evid. 601
OKLA. STAT. § 12-2601
OR. REV. STAT. § 40.310
PA. STAT. ANN. § 42-5911 (Purdon)
S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 19-14-1
UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 78-24-2; 76-5-410
WASH. REV. CODE § 5.60.050
WIS. STAT. § 906.01
WYO. STAT. § 1-138
*Information for these charts was obtained through research by the ABA's Child Sexual
Abuse Law Reform Project (including the help of the project's law clerk, Carl Jenkins) and
from a legislative survey prepared for a report of a recent project on child victim legal reforms
by ABT Associates, Boston, Massachusetts (the final report will be available in the spring,
1985, and will be known as When the Victim is a Child. Issues for Judges and Prosecutors).
**Some apply in both criminal and civil cases, and some in all child abuse cases, but most
cover criminal child sex offense cases only.
'Videotaped preliminary hearing testimony for use at trial.
'Videotaped testimony for use at Grant Jury proceeding.
SThese laws were passed immediately before the publication of this article.
